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FAILED FRIENDSHIP, FORGOTTEN
GENEALOGIES:
SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR AND LUCE IRIGARAY
Luce lrigaray opens je ,tu, nous: Toward a Culture 0/
Difference with "A Personal Note." It begins:
What woman has not read The Second Sex? What woman
hasn' t found it inspiring? Hasn' t as a result, perhaps, become
a feminist? Simone de Beauvoir was indeed one of the first
women in this century to remind us of the extent of women' s
exploitation and to encourage every woman who had the good
fortune to come across her book to feelless isolated and more
certain about being oppressed or letting herself be taken in ...
Although I read The Second Sex, I was never close to Simone
de Beauvoir. Why? .. There are important differences
between our positions which as far as friendship and mutual
assistance goes, I had hoped could be overcome. In actual fact
they were not ... What can we make then of this distance kept
up between two women who could, indeed should have
worked together? (9-11)
Probing Beauvoir' s "reticence," lrigaray traces it to two
causes. First, she finds that Beauvoir could not accept her commitment
to psychoanalysis- could not endure her use of psychoanalysis in
understanding the sexual determination of the development and history
of consciousness. Second, she determines that Beauvoir could not
accept the idea that the quest for equality is an insufficient ground
for/of women' s liberation, and could not, therefore, support the
advocacy of sexed rights.
Neither I nor lrigaray can be sure that this explains the matter.
We cannot know why Beauvoir never responded when lrigaray sent her
a copy of Speculum. We can only guess at the reasons for Beauvoir' s
silence. Like lrigaray, I regret the absence of friendship between these
two seminal feminist thinkers; for if, as Nietzsche and Derrida suggest,
the "best" friend is the worthy enemy, then this is a friendship that
should have been. Despite Beauvoir' s refusal, lrigaray ends her
"Personal Note" with a gesture of friendship. Situating her work within
the horizon opened by The Second Sex lrigaray writes:
To respect Simone de Beauvoir is to follow the theoretical
and practical work for social justice that she carried out in her
oWß way; it is to nlaintain the liberating horizons which she
opened up for many women and men.. .It seems to me that her
concern for and writings on this subject are a message not be
forgotten.(lrigaray,je 13-14)
And yet lrigaray forgets. She turns a deaf ear to the ways in
which The Second Sex calls for a transvaluation (not an eradication) of
the sexual difference. She hears Beauvoir' s demands for political and
economic equality as a call for an androgynous future rather than as a
call for a future in which sex and gender are lived differently. Not
reading The Second Sex within the context of The Ethics ofAmbiguity's
descriptions of intentionality, lrigaray does not probe the ways in which
her genealogical debt to Beauvoir goes beyond the general fact that The
Second Sex opened her (our) feminist eyes. In short, because lrigaray
reads Beauvoir as an uncomplicated "equality" feminist, she positions
herself and Beauvoir as oppositional thinkers. I think that this is both
mistaken and unfortunate because it simplifies the differences between
her and Beauvoir and repeats the all too familiar philosophical gesture
of negating the other.
The Second Sex is a politically liberatory and philosophically
demanding text. In identifying the injustices suffered by women
idealized as woman and habituated to be feminine, it alerts us to the
desires that create and sustain the social, political and economic
structures of patriarchy. Most importantly, in attempting to determine
why it is that women, unlike other oppressed groups fail to rebel, it
distinguishes the category of the Other from the category of the
inessential other. The category of the Other belongs to the Hegelian
dialectic of violence, recognition and reconciliation. It grounds Sartre' s
analysis of "The Look". It appears to be gender neutral. Beauvoir
discovers the lie of the appearance. She details the ways in which the
category of the other is distinctly masculine.
The category of the Other, according to Beauvoir, is a
specifically patriarchal category. Only men fight to the death, demand
mutual recognition, and exchange looks. Women, Beauvoir shows us,
are excluded from the possibilities of rebellion, revolution or
reconciliation. Barred from being the Other, they are confined to the
place of the inessential other. As each other's other, men enact their
desire. As men's inessential other, women reflect men's desires back to
them. They may not and must not articulate adesire of their OWß.
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When lrigaray speaks of wornen as lacking a syrnbolic rneans
of expressing their desire-as not (yet) existing-she is in fact echoing
Beauvoir, who in the opening pages of The Second Sex wonders
whether she reallyexists. Beauvoir introduces The Second Sex with a
question. "What", she asks, "is a wornan?" (xix). Within the space of a
page, she determines that though it is certain that women exist, it is also
clear that women' s existence can only be admitted provisionally (xxi).
Beauvoir is certain that women exist because she cannot doubt that she
exists. She must, if she wishes to affirm her existence ':first of all say: 1
am a woman; on this truth must be based all further discussion" (xxi,
emphasis added). Her existential certainty, however, is riddled with
problems. For once Beauvoir asks for adefinition of woman (of herself
insofar as she is first of all a woman), she discovers that so many
accounts are provided (with so many being contrary to each other) that
she cannot say which, if any, are real/true. Caught in the Cartesian
dilemma-she is certain that she is but doubts who she is-Beauvoir
cannot follow Descartes' strategy; for she acknowledges a certainty
that escaped Descartes. There are two distinguishable human types:
men and women. It is impossible to identify oneself as a human being
without first taking one's place in the sexual register. The certainty of
being sexed is inseparable from the certainty of being human. 1
1 read Beauvoir' s affirmation of this double certainty as a claim
about the human condition. lrigaray, 1 think, reads it as a provisional
claim about patriarchal humanity, for she reads Beauvoir as intent on
erasing the sexual difference. Which of us is correct is not what is at
stake here however. Whether Beauvoir sees the sexual difference as part
of the injustice of patriarchy, or whether she sees it as a necessary mark
of our humanness, that she sees the sexual difference as a difference that
marks women as (presently) absent and men as fully present situates her
as a genealogieal friend of lrigaray. lrigaray, however much she may
respect Beauvoir, does not recognize her genealogieal debt. Given what
she teaches us about the ways in which patriarchy erases women's
genealogies and about the ways in which this erasure is essential to the
power of patriarchy, this lack of recognition is particularly troubling.
The depths of this trouble may be seen if we turn to lrigaray' s Ethics of
Sexual Difference and her reflections on Descartes' first passion-
wonder.
1 For a discussion of the relationship between Descartes and Beauvoir
see Simons 202 and Bauer 46-77.
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lrigaray opens An Ethics ofSexual Difference telling us that
though some overtures have been made to the world of women, no new
values have been established. Lacking these values, women's "issues"
remain at the level of critical demands. As merely critical demands
they are unsustainable. To have an enduring effect, women's
"demands" must be seen as necessary corollaries of the values of an
ethics of sexual difference. According to lrigaray, there has been a
"worldwide erosion of gains won in women's struggles" because these
gains are seen as political or economic expediencies rather than as
ethical necessities. An Ethics ofSexual Difference draws the lines of an
ethics of sexual difference and establishes the ways in which women's
demands, far from being merely expedient, are necessary corollaries of
this ethics.
We might, from a glance at the table of contents of An Ethics
ofSexual Difference, conclude that the matter of wonder is marginal to
these issues. But tables of contents can be deceiving. For if the essay
on Descartes' passion of wonder, one of the shorter pieces in the
volume, seems buried within the text, the passion of wonder, defined as
the passion of otherness elicited by the encounter with the forever
unknowable of the other sex, permeates lrigaray' s discussions of the
possibilities, implications and meanings of an ethics of sexual
difference (Ethics 8 and 13). For lrigaray, an ethics of sexual
difference is an ethics of wonder. Whether Descartes' wonder can,
without appeal to Beauvoir, serve lrigaray's ethics is the matter at hand.
Descartes' wonder is not a simple passion. It is always
accompanied by a mood. This mood is crucial. Whether wonder, the
astonishment at the encounter with the unexpected, is accompanied by
the mood of anxiety, delight, or joy determines the ways in which
wonder positions itself vis-a-vis desire. It determines whether wonder
will become for ethics what the cogito became for Descartes'
epistemology and metaphysics, the root that nourishes everything that
follows; or whether wonder's priority will be reduced to a matter of
origins analogous to the priority of the child to the adult, something to
be outgrown as we mature. The wonder of anxiety is quickly displaced
by the desires/judgments of love and hate. The wonder of joy does not
flee from itself in the rush to judgment and desire. It delights in its
openness to the surprise of the other. Going through the history of
philosophy, we learn to distinguish the moods ofwonder. We learn
how to spot the Trojan horse.
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lrigaray is, I think, correct. The ground of an ethics of sexual
difference must be wonder. Descartes' wonder, however, will not
direct us to this ethics. His wonder falls prey to the mood of anxiety. It
fuels the economy of the same. An ethics of sexual difference needs the
ground of a wonder of delight and joy. For it is only as accompanied
by the mood of joy that wonder is embraced as the useless passion, a
passion that is not a means to the end of desire but adelight that is an
end in itself. If we need Descartes to remind us of the passion that
Freud forgot, we need Beauvoir to embed this passion in its proper
mood-joy.
This becomes clear if we situate lrigaray' s reading of
Descartes' Passions 01 the Soul within the context of her reading of the
Meditations. In Speculum lrigaray begins reading Descartes where
most interpreters begin. She takes up the question of Descartes' doubt.
Descartes goes to great pains to distinguish the criteria of falsity from
the criteria of doubtfulness. lrigaray is not interested in this sleight of
hand. Whether we declare something to be false or dubious we are
engaged in an act of negation. We say "no" to it. We disengage from
it. We withhold our attention. We become indifferent (Irigaray,
Speculum 182). Further, as a Cartesian doubter, I am motivated by the
desire for certainty. I say "no" in order to be able to say "yes" and I
will only say "yes" if it is impossible to say "no." First philosophy as
grounded in the desire for certainty; the desire for certainty sustained by
the no; the cogito as a refusal. This is lrigaray' s Descartes.
Arriving at this Descartes lrigaray probes Descartes' refusal.
An easy query from one point of view. Certainly no secret to any
reader of the Meditations. Descartes refuses the uncertainties of sense
experience. He has, lrigaray reminds us, discovered the tricks of the
eye. He is an expert in optics. As an expert he is also, however, duped.
Understanding mirrors, he is innocent when it comes to the illusions of
the mirror stage. Fleeing the (il)logic of the senses, he gets caught in
the logic of the specular imaginary. The cogito is an ego-imago.
Descartes, lrigaray teIls us, knows that the world always appears upside
down and is therefore subject to doubt. He refuses, however, to
consider that the subject is areversal of itself because he desires union
"with an image in a mirror" (Irigaray, Speculum 189).
Reading Descartes through Irigaray comes to this: If we begin
by saying "no," the certainty we arrive at is the certainty of the
imaginary. The desire for certainty, specifically the desire for the
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certainty of self identity must be understood as the desire for an
imaginary wholenessl autonomy. The doubt, the no that makes self-
affirmation possible, must also be understood as a refusal to
acknowledge our relationship to the (m)other. The method of doubt,
lrigaray teIls us, is "a refusal of anything not his same self [and
therefore] ... a refusal of all beginnings" (Irigaray, Speculum 183).
To doubt is to refuse the "precariousness of existence ... the chain of
relationships, the cord . .. the mysteries of conception" (Irigaray,
Speculum 182). Lured by the seduction ofthe mirror, pursuing the
desire to be himself, Descartes forgets the mother who kindIes his
desire. He forgets that he wants to be himself in order to establish
himself as the One the mother desires. Finding himself in a double bind
he cuts the cord; for if he acknowledges the mother then he cannot be
himself (autonomous), but if he is not himself (autonomous) he cannot
assure himself that he is the One of the mother' s desire. Ab, perhaps
Descartes (and we) can have it all? Perhaps he (and we) can cure
himself of the precariousness of existence by erasing the mysteries of
conception? Perhaps we can both be ourselves as autonomous, the One
that is desired, and be the one who legitimates our desire? Perhaps we
can escape the anxiety of finitude by giving birth to ourselves?
As I read lrigaray's account ofthe cogito, I am struck by the
ways in which the refusal of the (m)other is also and necessarily a
repudiation ofwonder. We are witnesses to a double murder. We are
also, it seems, confronted by the radical incompatibility between
Descartes' first methodological principle-the doubt that says "no"-
and bis first passion-the wonder that says "yes." Reading Descartes'
essay on the passions, however, we discover that for Descartes it is not
a matter of choosing between the no of first philosophy and the yes of
passion, but a matter of proper subordination. The yes of the first
passion will be appropriated by the no. The mood of anxiety will direct
the processes of sublimation. The first passion will disappear into
Oedipal desire.
If we return lrigaray' s reading of Descartes' cogito to
Descartes'discussion of wonder, we discover the link between saying
"no," the drive for autonomy, and the denigration ofwonder. Descartes
describes wonder as "a sudden surprise of the soul" and as a
prejudgmental receptive passivity (Descartes LXX). Unlike our other
passions, which as grounded in the judgments good and bad move us to
either pursue what we believe will benefit us, or avoid things we think
will harm us (Descartes LVII), wonder, not knowing the categories
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good and bad, neither moves to appropriate nor dismiss the objeet
before it. Taken up with the eategories rare and extraordinary wonder
eonsiders objeets in their own uniqueness rather than for their effeets on
us (Deseartes LXX). As synonymous with surprise with regard to both
the new of the unknown and the unexpeeted of what we already know,
the uniqueness of wonder lies in the fact that insofar as we are taken by
surprise we are unable to ealeulate and must therefore simply attend to
the givenness ofthe phenonlena. Wonder says pay attention. First
philosophy says withdraw, beeome indifferent, disengage from the
surprises of the world. First philosophy, in refusing the passivity of the
senses, saerifiees wonder to the desire for eertainty.
The propriety of this saerifiee is never questioned. It is
sometimes deseribed as a natural proeess, analogous to the hardening of
the soles of our feet; and sometimes identified with the diseipline of
seience. But however it is deseribed, Deseartes is adamant, we must
outgrow the passion of wonder. Deseartes' assessment of wonder, his
aeeount of its role in our lives is summed up as foUows: "... although it
is good to be born with some inelination toward this passion [of
wonder], beeause it disposes us toward the aequisition of the seiences,
we must at the same time try to free ourselves from it as mueh as
possible" (Deseartes LXXVI).
lrigaray teUs us that Deseartes' wonder is the appetite for
knowledge (Irigaray, Ethics 78). Deseartes identifies wonder as
disposing us toward the aequisition of the seiences. It stimulates the
appetite for knowledge. Onee stimulated, however, the appetite no
longer needs wonder. It ean and must dispense with the passion that
triggered its desire.
As wonder is said to dispose us toward seience, seienee is
eharged with proteeting us from the surprises of wonder. Its job is to
render the unfamiliar familiar. Deseartes never values wonder for itself;
for left to itself, wonder threatens us with the disease of blind euriosity.
What lrigaray asks us to eultivate, wonder without stopping, Deseartes
insists we eure (Irigaray, Ethics 81). Instead of elearly praising wonder
for bringing that whieh is unique to our attention, Deseartes is
ambiguous about the value of wonder. Ultimately he identifies it as a
diffieult passion requiring the diseipline of seience. Seience, however,
may not be enough to save us from the disease of wonder-blind
euriosity. Self-diseipline is also required. We must aeeustom ourselves
to turn away from unworthy novelties.
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I begin to hear echoes of the method of doubt-the withdrawal
that says "no." I read Descartes'definition of blind curiosity: "to seek
out things that are rare solely to wonder at them and not for the purpose
ofreally knowing them." I read his descriptions ofthe two symptoms
of this disease: (one) "[becoming] so given over to wonder that things
of no importance are no less capable of asserting their attention than
those whose investigation is more useful"; and (two) " a custom which
disposes the soul ... to pause over all ... objects which present
themselves provided that they appear to it to be ever so little new"
(Descartes LXXVIII). I remember the definition of wonder as
synonymous with surprise, and I hear anxiety. I hear a certain fear of
freedoms that escape our contro!. If all the subsequent passions stern
from our seeing objects (first brought to our attention by wonder) as
free agents which can either bring us good or harm (Descartes LV-
LVI); if the point of science is to give us a handle on these free agents,
then wonder-the receptive recognition of these unanticipated
freedoms-throws us into the contingencies of our existence. The
extent to which we can be surprised marks the limits of our power.
Within the context of Descartes' logic (the logic of Oedipus), wonder
means vulnerable. Surprises make us anxious. As anxious we move to
close ourselves off from the threat of the unexpected. With the help of
mathematics and reason, we create an ordered horne. We solve rather
than take delight in riddles. We keep the unheimlich at bay.
Descartes' anxiety about wonder goes further. When
Descartes attends to the passions of joy, love, delight, fear, despair,
indignation, or terror, the latter passions, fear indignation and terror are
either directly correlated with wonder or described in language used to
identify wonder. Joy and love are never associated with wonder.
Delight sometimes appears to be aligned with wonder and sometimes
not.
Minding the gap between Descartes'discussions of delight and
trying to understand why Descartes associates fear but not delight with
wonder, we see that wonder, the passion that precedes desire,
cannotlwill not become the passion that infonns desire, as long as the
strange is experienced as threatening rather than beautiful and
difference is identified with the experience of lack. We see how much
remains to be done before we can appropriate Descartes' wonder for an
ethics of sexual difference. We see why lrigaray needs to remember
Beauvoir. An ethics of sexual difference, grounded as it must be in
wonder, will come to nothing if it does not attend to and find an
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antidote for the ways wonder becomes Cartesian wonder, appropriated
by the desire for knowledge/power and caught up with the experiences
of fear, indignation, cowardice, and terror.
In his discussion ofwonder, Descartes argues that wonder,
insofar as it attends to worthy new and unexpected phenomena, is the
source of science. He wams us that becoming enamored with novelty
per se is ultimately unproductive. But once he treats the passions of
fear, indignation and terror we discover that surprises are not always
welcome. Now we leam that the unexpected is experienced as
dangerous. Fear, not wonder is now identified as our response to the
strange/stranger (Descartes CLXXVI). Further, fear or terror, which he
describes as a "coldness [and] also aperturbation and astonishment of
the soul which takes from it the power of resisting the evils which it
thinks lie at hand", is identified as a source of cowardice (Descartes
CLXXIV). To avoid cowardice, we must, it seems, protect ourselves
from the astonishment that causes fear. The best defense? "Nothing,"
Descartes teIls us, is "better for getting rid of [fear] than to use
premeditation to prepare oneself for all eventualities" (Descartes
CLXXVI).
In drawing our attention to the new and unique wonder
triggers our drive for knowledge. To know a thing is to und~rstand its
power to benefit or hann uso Such understanding puts it under our
power. When knowledge fails us, however, we are reminded of the
limits of our sovereignty. That which surprises us also marks us as
vulnerable. Far from taking delight in the novelty before us, we
become indignant. In Descartes' words:
we usually suppose that all things will be done in the manner
we judge they ought to be done, that is, in the way we esteem
to be good; that is why when it happens otherwise it surprises
us and we wonder at it. (Descartes CXCVII)
That which is strange surprises USo We may, according to
Descartes, respond to the surprise of the unexpected with wonder which
leads us to science, or fear which makes us cowards. There is also, he
notes, a third possibility, delight; further, there are two modes of
delight. The first is associated with love, the second with the
contemplation of beauty. The first concems the sexual difference.
lrigaray notes that Descartes does not situate the sexual difference at the
site of wonder. I note that he situates it here, at love: delight is elicited
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by "the difference of sex which nature has placed in men ... [which]
bring[s] it to pass that at a certain age and in a certain time they
consider themselves defective as though they were but the half of a
whole of which the individual of the other sex should be the other half.
In this way the acquisition of this half is confusedly represented by
nature as the greatest of all imaginable goods" (Descartes XC). This
description of delight is particularly striking given that Descartes also
teIls us that we take delight in encountering the "perfection we imagine
in a person whom we think may become another self' (Descartes XC).
We cannot, it seems, simply delight in the pelfection of the other as
another self without seeing it as an indictment of our lack and without
loving it, i.e. moving to acquire it for ourselves. The sexual difference,
here, is astranger to the passion of wondel. Delight, love and joy are
part of the ethics of calculation. They concern the judgments good and
bad. Associating delight with love by defining delight as "the
enjoyment of that which gives pleasure as the greatest part of all the
good things which pertain to man" (Descartes XC), and associating
both love and delight with joy, which he defines as "the belief that we
have of possessing some good" (Descartes XCII), Descartes severs
delight from wonder. Under the aegis of love, the prejudgmental yes of
wonder is taken up in the dialectic of lack and becomes the yes of
appropriation.
There is, however, a discussion of delight in Part Three of
Descartes' Passions where delight, like wonder, is distinguished from
judgments concerning good and bad, from love, the desire to possess
the good, and fromjoy, the beliefthat what we possess is good
(Descartes LXXXVI, LXI). Here, delight is described as '''love' for
beautiful things" (Descartes LXXXV), but is said to not really be love
because it is not adesire. Unlike the discussions of fear, where the link
is made to wonder, here no such link is noticed. Has Descartes
forgotten that what distinguishes wonder from the other passions is that,
like this delight described as 'love' of the beautiful, wonder is a mode
of receptivity rather than desire? In not making the connection between
this delight and wonder Descartes teIls us that his wonder is astranger
to delight. This estrangement is cmcial. As an experience of surprise
and novelty but not delight, Descartes' wonder cannot contest the
desires of calculation, control and possession. It cannot become the
ground of an ethics of sexual difference.
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The (Re)turn to Wonder-Simone de Beauvoir
The philosophical beginning that says "no" is grounded in the
desire for certainty. The passionate beginning that says "yes" is not yet
inscribed in the field of desire. By estranging wonder from delight and
reducing it to a necessary preliminary for science, by focusing on the
causes of wonder (innocence, curiosity, surprises), and by attending to
the mechanics of wonder (passivity of the senses), Descartes does not
probe the meaning of wonder as a receptive, non-judgmental mode of
attention. Aligning ethics with the judgments good and evil and
identifying the birth of desire with these judgments, Descartes consigns
wonder to the margins of our lives. He does not ask about the
possibility of adesire grounded in wonder as delight. As a
consequence, he cannot ask the following questions: Could 1 take the
judgment of the delight that loves without desire as a paradigm of the
ethical? Could 1 encounter the perfections of the other without
experiencing them as an index of my lack? Could 1 embrace beauty
without moving to enjoy-to possess-it?
lrigaray' s ethics of sexual difference calls on us to answer
these questions affirmatively. The question for me, however, is not
whether we should say "yes "but whether and how we can leam to say
"yes." Irigaray reads Descartes'discussion of wonder as directing us
toward the yes. 1 read it as a lesson in why we say "no." It is more than
a matter of seeing the glass half empty or half full. It is a matter of
understanding the Oedipallogic of anxiety; of discerning how we are
implicated in it; and of determining how the subterranean promise of
Descartes'description of delight in part three of The Passions can be
brought to fruition.
lrigaray reads Descartes' wonder for its utopian vision.
Taking up her vision, 1 read Descartes' account of the first passion for
its lessons in what must be done for this vision to become real. For me,
the lessons are these: (1) we must disengage wonder from anxiety; (2)
we must not only learn to value the yes of uncertainty- the yes that
welcomes the unknown, the surprise, the other-we must leam to prefer
it to the yes (of certainty) grounded in the no; and (3) instead of
allowing desire to establish the meaning and value of wonder we must
insist that wonder inform desire. Taking up these lessons, we are
confronted with the task of transforming our fear of chance into an
embrace of the event.
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There is a sense in which nineteenth- and twentieth-century
developments in phenomenology, existentialism, and feminism may be
read as engaged in the task of transvaluating Descartes' first passion
into lrigaray's wonder. The phenomenological epoche which asks us to
disengage from the assumptions of everyday life, not in order to
distance ourselves from the sensual but in order to pay closer attention
to it~ and the existential reformulation of intentionality which refuses
the disengagement of the epoche in order to more fully engage
phenomenological attentiveness, may be read as steps on the road to
lrigaray's wonder. They may be read as moves to ground philosophy in
the yes rather than the no.
Simone de Beauvoir's reformulation of intentionality is cfUcial
in this movement. With Beauvoir intentionality becomes ambiguous. It
is described as moving between two moments, a moment of disclosure
and a moment of appropriation. Each of these moments embodies a
distinct attitude toward being. As distinct, however, these moments and
their moods are inseparable. Rejecting the logic of the either/or for the
logic of ambiguity, Beauvoir' s description of intentionality inscribes
difference in the field of the bond.
Though she uses the terms "delight" and "joy," Beauvoir' s
description of the first moment of intentionality recalls us to
Descartes'discussions of the first passion and calls us to lrigaray' s
wonder. But unlike Descartes, who allows Oedipal anxiety to corrupt
wonder, Beauvoir preserves wonder's place. According to Beauvoir,
"There is an original type of attachment to being ... which is the
relationship , wanting to disclose being'" (Beauvoir, Ethics 12).
Beauvoir distinguishes this bond to the becoming of being from a
subsequent moment and relationship to being which she calls "wanting
to be" and which she describes as the desire to appropriate. Just as
Descartes, Beauvoir notes that we are not content to remain in, or
cannot sustain, that moment she calls "disclosure" and he "wonder."
Descartes says that we are moved to judgment, that we are moved to
possess what appears through the passions of love. Beauvoir agrees
with him, but she is also clearer about this movement. These
judgments-this love- are the mark of anxiety. And whereas
Descartes validates and endorses this flight from the surprises and
unceltainties of wonder for the securities and certainties of science and
the judgments good and bad, Beauvoir embraces the desire to disclose
being and refuses to privilege the desires of judgment and possession.
She validates the inevitability of uncertainty. Identifying the judgments
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good and bad, true and false as attempts to appropriate the world, she
teIls us that these attempts, though necessary, are also necessarily
fragile. Ultimately the attempt to appropriate fails. "I cannot,"
Beauvoir writes, "appropriate the snow field where I slide. It remains
foreign, forbidden ..." (Ethics 12).
What is most important in Beauvoir' s account of this
inevitable failure, however, is this: rather than marking it as a sign of
our lack and identifying it with the mood of mourning, she aligns it with
the moods of joy and delight. In her words: " I take delight in this
every effort toward an impossible possession" (Ethics 12). Now desire
is radically refigured. It is not appropriation that brings joy, but its
impossibility. It is not by enclosing the world within my sphere of
influence but in encountering it as foreign and forbidden that I
experience joy. Surprising freedoms are not the source of fear or
cowardice. They elicit my delight. This delight does not threaten to
infect me with the disease of blind curiosity.
Following Beauvoir, I discover that as wonder lures me to
love, the desire to possess the other, the failure of love, the
impossibility of possessing the other" s freedom return me to wonder. I
learn that it is the failure af my desire that makes me human; for in
acknowledging bath my desire and its failure, I situate myself as
meaning-giver of the world within the mood of wonder. As a meaning-
giver who must fail at becoming the law I recognize my bond with
wonder, the passion that binds me to the limits ofthe law. Retumed to
the joy of this excess, I will not be content to remain with its delights.
But I do not repudiate them. Without situating myself as astranger in
the world (Camus) I remember that I am bound to a world that is not
mine.
With Beauvoir, Descartes' structure ofthe passions is
challenged. Wonder, the passion that is not yet the desire to own or
control, remains the first passion. It is not, however, appropriated by
the utilitarian ethics of good and bad or the desires of love and hate. In
Beauvoir's schema this ethics and these desires are recognized as
secondary and subordinate. Instead of being told to outgrow wonder,
we leam how we are continually retumed to it and that this retum is
filled with delight. With Beauvoir, finitude- understood as the failure
to be God, the inability to control the real, and the impossibility of
reducing the world to the category of the useful-is the source of joy
not anxiety. Wonder, our response to the surprise ofthe new, the
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unforeseen and the unexpected, is now understood as that passion·that
alerts us to the fact that we are neither alone in nor in control of the
world.
In calling on us to follow the delight of wonder, Beauvoir does
not call us to an ethics of sexual difference. From her point of view,
such an ethics bifurcates the ambiguity that guarantees the circulation of
desire between the delight of wonder and the drive to be. It undermines
the relationship between ethics and politics. But if we focus on the
quarrel between Beauvoir and lrigaray, we lose sight of their
genealogical relationship and miss the point that however significant
that quarrel it is less important than the fact that Descartes' wonder
becomes available to/for lrigaray"s ethics of sexual difference through
Beauvoir' s mediation. In linking her ethics of sexual difference to the
father of wonder without reference to the woman who drove the anxiety
out of wonder so that it could become the place of delight and the site
of the erotic event, lrigaray neglects her own maternallineage. This
neglect has its consequences.
lrigaray calls us to the question of sexual difference. It is, she
insists, the cmcial question of our age. In raising the question of the
other and privileging one particular form of otherness, lrigaray' s ethics
of sexual difference presumes that we know how to properly form the
question of the other, for only on that condition can we understand why
sexual rather than racial or class difference is the cmcial question of our
age. We need to go through Beauvoir for this understanding. In
attending to the way the Other as an historically constituted site of
exploitation has been the site of rebellion and revolution for all others
except women, The Second Sex allows us to see how privileging the
question of sexual difference opens us out to rather than closes us off
from other questions of difference, otherness, and exploitation.
By attending to the ways in which lrigaray's turn to Descartes
requires the mediation of Beauvoir, I do not intend to reduce lrigaray to
an echo of Beauvoir. Genealogical relationships are transformative not
repetitive. If lrigaray must take up Beauvoir' s descriptions of the "is"
of intentionality' s joy and delight to save Descartes' wonder from its
Oedipal anxieties, lrigaray also transforms Beauvoir' s
phenomenological "is" of the first intentional moment into an ethical
imperative which insists on the "ought" of that joy Descartes called
"wonder." While paying her debt to Descartes, lrigaray ignored
Beauvoir's gift. Is this why Beauvoir refused her friendship?
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From a theoretical perspective, lrigaray' s An Ethics 0/Sexual
Difference reads the philosophical tradition for its other voice. From a
practical perspective, it provides the necessary ethical foundation for a
sustainable politics of sexual equity. Feminist theory has taught us that
the theoretical and the practical are tethered. A theory that insists that
proper sublimation requires giving the mother her proper place must
enact its theoretical requirements. If it speaks of the mother by
returning to the father, the specter of the father will haunt it. It will
return us to the place we hoped to leave. Hoping to escape the reign of
violence, for example, we may find ourselves seduced into giving it
new territory. If we fail to work Descartes' concept of wonder through
Beauvoir's concept of ambiguity, we may not hear Bataille's warning
about the violence enlbedded in intimacy and unleashed by its excess.
In attacking the injustices of the ordered world of reason and returning
to wonder to free ourselves from that world's grip, we may forget the
ways in which this world protects us from the excess ofwonder's ethic
of the useless. Although the concept of the useless offers an antidote to
the nihilisms of an exchange economy, in directing us to the useless
consumption "which I am intimately" it mayaIso release a violence
without limit (Bataille 58-59).
In alerting us to the failure of the desire to be and in refusing
to treat this failure as a loss, Beauvoir' s description of our two-fold
intentionality also alerts us to the limits of wonder. She does not
formulate these limits in Bataille's terms, perhaps because Bataille
misunderstands the intimacy of wonder or because Beauvoir too is
guilty of idealizing the erotic. Either way the crucial point remains that
the paradigm of ambiguity alerts us to the importance of probing
Bataille's warnings and provides us with a theoretical structure for
doing so. It saves us from the trap of inverting the relationship between
wonder and desire.
To ask lrigaray to go through Beauvoir is not to ask her to
agree with Beauvoir. Rather it is to encourage lrigaray to take a closer
look at wonder' s relationship to desire to prevent her ethics of sexual
difference from unreflectively calling up the anxieties of wonder, the
violent excesses of wonder, or the politics of Oedipus. There is no
guarantee that going through Beauvoir will save lrigaray' s ethics of
sexual difference from its difficulties. But in a world without
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guarantees, paying one' s genealogieal debts is the first gesture of
friendship and a emeial step toward enaeting an ethies of sexual
differenee.
George Mason University Debra Bergoffen
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